1. Did the district court deny Petitioner's constitutional right to present a defense, and thereby commit a trial error of constitutional dimension, when the district court applied the Federal Rules of Evidence in such an arbitrary manner as to effectively remove Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(D) from the evidence rules which Petitioner was permitted to utilize in presenting his entrapment defense to the government's conspiracy charges?

2. Is the district court's error in removing Evid.R. 801(d)(2)(D) from the evidence rules which Petitioner was permitted to utilize in presenting his entrapment defense subject to the more rigorous Chapman harmless error standard which requires the government to prove that the error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt," a standard the government cannot meet in the circumstances of this case?

3. Did the Sixth Circuit impermissibly burden Petitioner's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at his trial, and otherwise violate his rights, when––in determining whether the district court's error was harmless or not when it barred Petitioner from presenting the 801(d)(2)(D) statements ––the appellate court held that Petitioner's failure to testify in his own defense relegated the district court's error to review for harmlessness under the government-favorable Kotteakos standard and not the more rigorous Chapman standard?

Did the district court deny Petitioner's constitutional right to present a defense by arbitrarily removing Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(D) from the available evidence rules in an entrapment defense case?