1. Whether a state court's application of summary
judgment standards, by excluding qualified expert
affidavits through credibility assessments rather than
admissibility determinations, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause by denying a fair
trial, in conflict with federal appellate decisions, such
as City of Pomona v. SQM North America Corp. ,
750 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2014), and Supreme Court
precedent, such as Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,
477 U.S. 242 (1986).

2. Whether a state court's failure to provide clear notice
to a pro se litigant of summary judgment affidavit
requirements, including the need to oppose all facts
including the standard of care, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause in light of divergent
circuit approaches mandating notice for all pro se
litigants ( Vital v. Interfaith Medical Center , 168 F.3d
615 (2d Cir. 1999); Roseboro v. Garrison , 528 F.2d 309
(4th Cir. 1975); Timms v. Frank , 953 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.
1992); Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. One Colt Python .357 Cal. Revolver ,
845 F.2d 287 (11th Cir. 1988)), denying mandatory
notice for non-prisoners ( Jacobsen v. Filler , 790
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); Brock v. Hendershott , 840
F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1988)), or applying discretionary
standards ( Renchenski v. Williams , 622 F.3d 315 (3d
Cir. 2010); Murrell v. Bennett , 615 F.2d 306 (5th Cir.
1980); Neal v. Kelly , 963 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1992)),
necessitating uniform due process standards.

Whether a state court's application of summary judgment standards violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by excluding qualified expert affidavits and whether failure to provide clear notice to a pro se litigant of summary judgment affidavit requirements violates due process