(1) Whether a judicial conclusion that no set of facts can plausibly exist to plead under the ADA that an employer regards an employee as presently disabled—by being diseased in the absence of immune system augmentation—misinterprets the plain language of the statutory amendments and express Congressional intent to construe disability as broadly as possible to prohibit discrimination.

(2) Whether barring employee claims under the ADA by narrowly redefining the statutory definition of disability to effectively remove "being regarded as having such an impairment" pertaining to immune system augmentation constitutes impermissible judicial usurpation of Congress' legislative function in violation of constitutional Separation of Powers.

Whether a judicial conclusion that no set of facts can plausibly exist to plead under the ADA that an employer regards an employee as presently disabled misinterprets the plain language of the statutory amendments and Congressional intent to construe disability broadly, and whether narrowly redefining the statutory definition of disability constitutes impermissible judicial usurpation of Congress's legislative function