Under this Court's well-established qualified-immunity framework, courts conduct a two-part analysis to resolve an officer's qualified-immunity defense on summary judgment. First, a court takes the historical facts "in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury" and then determines, as a matter of law, whether these facts "show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007). Thus, in Fourth Amendment cases like this one, a court determines at the first step whether the historical facts, viewed in plaintiff's favor, show the officer's actions were objectively unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 381 n.8.

Second, a court determines whether the officer's conduct "violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights." Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam). This "inquiry 'must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.'" Id. at 5–6. "[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context," id. at 6, particularly where "split-second judgments" are concerned, Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1363 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

The questions presented are:

1. Whether, when conducting an objective reasonableness analysis to determine if an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, a reviewing court lacks jurisdiction over a district court's determinations regarding imminent danger because imminent danger is a question of fact rather than a question of law.

2. Whether the Tenth Circuit departed from this Court's decisions in cases like Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (2018) (per curiam), by denying qualified immunity despite the lack of clearly established law imposing liability in analogous circumstances?

Whether a reviewing court lacks jurisdiction over a district court's determination of imminent danger in a qualified immunity analysis, and whether the Tenth Circuit improperly denied qualified immunity without clearly established law