As discussed in a nearly-identical, unopposed petition (24-1192), the extent to which federal courts can exert power over third-party claims and claimants is a question of national significance that has arisen with increasing frequency in a variety of contexts. This Court has itself curtailed multiple courts' attempts to exercise authority over objecting parties or non-parties the last two terms. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S.Ct. 2540 (2025) (courts can award complete equitable relief only to parties); Texas v. New Mexico, 602 U.S. 943 (2024) (settling parties cannot dispose of non-settling objector's claims); Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204 (2024) (bankruptcy code does not permit nonconsensual release of third-party claims). Five circuits have also issued conflicting decisions on courts' equitable authority over third party claims, but in the equitable receivership arena—when courts appoint receivers in SEC enforcement actions to manage distressed debtors' assets, then oversee their division among creditors. The Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and now the Ninth Circuit permit federal receivership courts to approve a receiver's settlement with a non-receivership entity that enjoins third-party claims against that entity without the claimants' consent. But the Sixth Circuit forbids the nonconsensual release of claims that belong to a third party in the name of equity. The question thus presented, and ripe for review, is:

Whether a federal court overseeing an equity receivership has equitable authority to dispose of claims that belong to a third-party against non-receivership entities without the claimants' consent.

Whether a federal court overseeing an equity receivership has equitable authority to dispose of claims that belong to a third-party against non receivership entities without the claimants' consent