1. Whether a state appellate court may resolve a properly presented federal appearance-of-bias claim exclusively under state-law recusal doctrine without applying the governing Fourteenth Amendment standard articulated in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), and its progeny.

2. Whether harmless-error doctrine may be used to affirm a judgment after a litigant has raised a federal structural-bias claim grounded in this Court's precedent, where adjudicative neutrality is plausibly implicated. See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016).

3. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment permits affirmance of a civil judgment where the jury's special verdict simultaneously affirms and negates the same legally operative predicate of liability, thereby sustaining a judgment resting on irreconcilable findings.

Whether a state appellate court may resolve a federal appearance-of-bias claim exclusively under state-law recusal doctrine without applying the Fourteenth Amendment standard from Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., and whether harmless-error doctrine may affirm a judgment after a structural-bias claim is raised where adjudicative neutrality is implicated