1. Whether a discriminatory Title IX investigation—
whose findings are relied upon by a decisionmaker
to impose concrete employment consequences—can
constitute an adverse employment action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.

2. Whether a court of appeals may affirm summary
judgment in a race-discrimination case by crediting
an employer's asserted "honest belief" and resolving
disputed facts and witness credibility in the employer's
favor, notwithstanding evidence of contradictory sworn
testimony, shifting explanations, and unsubstantiated
justifications, in conflict with Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), and
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

3. Whether an employer's reliance on new or expanded
justifications for an adverse employment action—raised
only after litigation begins—may be deemed nonpretextual on the ground that those reasons are merely
"additional" to earlier explanations, contrary to Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000),
and decisions of other circuits holding that shifting or post
hoc explanations permit an inference of discrimination.

4. Whether a court misapplies the "but-for" causation
standard clarified in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.
Ct. 1731 (2020), by treating the employer's articulation
of multiple asserted reasons for an adverse employment
action as defeating causation, rather than asking whether
race was a determinative cause of the decision.

5. Whether a court may reject comparator evidence
and discount biased or procedurally irregular internal
investigations at summary judgment by accepting the
employer's disputed factual narrative and imposing
a near-identity requirement, contrary to McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Staub
v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011).

Whether a discriminatory Title IX investigation whose findings are relied upon by a decisionmaker to impose concrete employment consequences can constitute an adverse employment action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and whether courts may affirm summary judgment in race-discrimination cases by crediting an employer's honest belief while resolving disputed facts in the employer's favor, contrary to Reeves and Anderson, and whether an employer's reliance on new or expanded justifications raised after litigation begins may be deemed nonpretextual, and whether courts misapply the but-for causation standard by treating multiple asserted reasons as defeating causation rather than asking whether race was determinative