Thomas L. Wheeler, et al. v. United States
DueProcess FifthAmendment Privacy
1. This case presents an important constitutional question regarding the "judge-alone special court-martial" first authorized by Congress in 2016. Congress has provided military servicemembers with the right to choose to be tried by a "judge alone" (instead of by a panel of fellow servicemembers) for non-capital offenses since 1968. But the 2016 revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice provided, for the first time, for cases in which a servicemember could be tried by a "judge alone" without their consent—including for at least some felonies.
2. The applicants were each tried and convicted by a "judge-alone special court-martial," despite preserving constitutional objections to being tried by a judge alone without their consent. Those arguments were rejected by the trial judges in each of their cases; by the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals; and by CAAF. Although the facts of applicants' cases vary, their constitutional arguments are the same. Thus, after CAAF issued its opinion in Wheeler, it summarily affirmed the convictions in Diaz and Martin in light of its analysis in Wheeler.
3. As of now, the applicants intend to file a consolidated petition for certiorari under SUP. CT. R. 12.4, urging this Court to take up—and resolve—the constitutionality of such a radical departure from the history and tradition of (and constitutional justifications for) courts-martial. Specifically, applicants will argue that the "judge-alone special court-martial" violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as it deprives servicemembers of the most fundamental procedural protection that military courts have ever provided. This issue is of substantial importance not only in applicants' cases, but because if the judge-alone special court-martial is constitutional in this context, then Congress could presumably eliminate court-martial panels in all non-capital cases.
4. The 30-day extension in Wheeler and the four-day extensions in Diaz and Martin are necessary because of the press of other business, including counsel's curricular obligations and additional pending litigation matters. In addition, the extension will facilitate the filing of a single, consolidated petition in the three cases, rather than three separate petitions——thereby conserving this Court's (and counsel's) resources.
Whether the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) permits a military court to impose a conviction based on legal interpretations that potentially infringe upon a service member's constitutional due process rights