Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana, et al. v. United States, et al.
1. The petition for a writ of certiorari would raise two issues. The first is the manner of analyzing the redressability prong of Article III standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Declaratory Judgment Act states that "any court of the United States ... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). This Court has held that "so long as the case retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy, which is finally determined by the judgment below," cases awarding only declaratory relief are cases or controversies under Article III. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1938) (cited with approval in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007)). The test for Article III standing requires plaintiffs to show "the injury likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief." FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380 (2024). Nevertheless, on interlocutory appeal, after affirming on injury and causation, the Ninth Circuit held a constitutional claim for declaratory relief fails the redressability prong of standing "absent further court action." App. 14a—15a. The Ninth Circuit's holding splits with other Circuits and puts standing requirements in conflict with this Court's precedents affirming the Declaratory Judgment Act is consistent with Article III's case or controversy requirement.
The second issue is the scope of a district court's discretion to grant leave to amend after a court of appeals dismisses a case for lack of Article III standing and does not rule on whether amendment could cure the deficiency. "[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Absent a finding of undue delay, bad faith, or futility of amendment, leave to amend should "be 'freely given." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). Nevertheless, in its May 1, 2024 writ of mandamus to the district court, the Ninth Circuit held its prior dismissal on interlocutory appeal for lack of standing, App. 15a—which was silent on leave to amend, and conducted no futility analysis—left no "room for amendment." App. 4a. The Ninth Circuit's May 1 decision calls into question the scope of a district court's discretion to grant leave to amend after dismissal for Article III standing, splitting with its sister Circuits.
Whether the Ninth Circuit improperly restricted Article III standing requirements by imposing additional barriers to declaratory relief beyond the Supreme Court's established precedents