1. The National Labor Relations Board's
interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act are
entitled to deference if they are "reasonably defensible."
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB , 441 U.S. 488, 495–97 (1979).
Congress made a "conscious decision" to "delegate[e]
to the Board . . . the primary responsibility of marking
out the scope of the statutory language. . . ." Id. at 496.
In Loper Light Enterprises v. Raimondo , this Court
held that when a statute constitutionally delegates
discretionary authority to an agency, "courts must respect
the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within
it." 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024). The Sixth Circuit here,
citing Loper Light , stated that it "does not defer to the
NLRB's interpretation of the NLRA. . . ."
The first question is: Does this Court's deferential
standard of review for NLRB interpretations of the
NLRA survive Loper Light ?

2. Congress may create multi-member agencies
led by presidentially appointed officers removable only
for cause. E.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States , 295
U.S. 602 (1935). The NLRB is an example of such an
"independent" agency. Board orders, however, are not
self-executing; the Board depends on its presidentially
appointed General Counsel to seek their enforcement in
court. On Inauguration Day 2021, the President fired the
General Counsel without cause.
The second question is: May the President remove the
NLRB General Counsel at will or only for cause?

Does this Court's deferential standard of review for NLRB interpretations of the NLRA survive Loper Bright?