I. Whether a pro se litigant with documented severe mental illness is entitled to
appointed counsel in a civil rights employment matter under Title VII when their
disability hinders their ability to represent themselves.

II. Whether a federal court may lawfully dismiss a subsequent Title VII claim based
on a second EEOC right-to-sue letter involving different retaliatory acts, by treating
it as duplicative of a prior charge without allowing the plaintiff to clarify
distinctions or amend the pleadings.

III. Whether equitable tolling should apply when a disabled plaintiff continued to
engage in the administrative process in good faith, misunderstood deadlines due to
mental illness, and was not permitted to amend or clarify her claims before
dismissal with prejudice.

IV. Whether a district court abuses its discretion and denies meaningful access to
justice under the Due Process Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) when it refuses to
appoint counsel for a mentally ill, indigent pro se plaintiff pursuing a Title VII civil
rights claim, where the complexity of the case and the plaintiffs condition render
self-representation impossible.

Whether a pro se litigant with documented severe mental illness is entitled to appointed counsel in a civil rights employment matter under Title VII when their disability hinders their ability to represent themselves