Is a RULE 60 Motion, Fraud upon the court, sufficient basis for judicial intervention, review and decision on its merits? Yes. However, this court provided no meaningful review, response and decision on its merits.

Did the Appeals Court extend deference to agency resolutions of questions of law? Yes, erroneously. See; No. 22-1219, Relentless. Inc., et al. v. Department of Commerce, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837. Loper Light Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. "The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled. Pp. 7-35. (a) Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate "Cases " and "Controversies "—concrete disputes with consequences for the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those disputes would not always be clear, but envisioned that the final "interpretation of the laws " would be "the proper and peculiar province of the courts. " The Federalist No. 71 p. 525 (A. Hamilton). As Chief Justice Marshall declared in the foundational decision of Marbury v. Madison, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 1 Cranch 137, 177. In the decades following Marbury, when the meaning of a statute was at issue, the judicial role was to "interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties. " Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515. Comer Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Does Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200 (1994) require courts to ask whether a "comprehensive review process ' exists for Veteran Preference Eligibles and VRA Eligibles in MSPB adjudications? Yes.

Does the longstanding solicitude of Congress for veterans and its special regard for veterans ' pro-veteran canon, as the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, stems from Congress 's intent to help veterans when enacting legislation providing them benefits, provide a righ to MSPB and court hearings where veteran benefits are at issue? Yes. Boone v. Lightner, benefits statutes must be "liberally construed " in favor of veterans and veterans law must be read as what Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, terms "an organic whole " with each individual statute given "as liberal a construction for the benefit of the veteran as harmonious interplay of the separate provisions permits. " Furthermore, under Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, Rudisill argues, any ambiguities in such statutes should be in favor of veterans and against "harsh penalties " for veterans. Thus, although Rudisill argues that there are n ambiguities in the statute and that the statute must be read in their favor, Rudisill posits that even if there were ambiguities in the statute, the pro-veteran canon dictates that such ambiguities must be resolved in veterans ' favor

Is a Rule 60 Motion for Fraud upon the Court sufficient basis for judicial intervention and review on its merits?