No. 24-7239
Tags: circuit-split first-amendment obstruction-offense stalking-statute statutory-construction true-threats
Latest Conference:
2025-06-18
Question Presented (from Petition)
1. Whether an intent to "harass" or "intimidate" under the federal stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, has an "ordinary" broad meaning or instead is limited to true threats and by the First Amendment principles in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023) and other canons of statutory construction.
2. Whether closing an e-mail account can constitute the "obstruction" offense in 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
Question Presented (AI Summary)
Whether an intent to 'harass' or 'intimidate' under the federal stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, has an 'ordinary' broad meaning or is limited to true threats by First Amendment principles
Docket Entries
2025-06-23
Petition DENIED.
2025-06-04
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/18/2025.
2025-05-30
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2025-05-14
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due June 18, 2025)
Attorneys
Ian Diaz
Benjamin Lee Coleman — Benjamin L. Coleman Law PC, Petitioner
United States
D. John Sauer — Solicitor General, Respondent