1. This Honorable Court has declared that Counsel renders ineffective assistance
in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence ina capital punish
ment case; therefore, is it equally fair to declare the same in a non
capital case when the punishment range is 25-99 to life without the possi
bility or consideration of parole eligibility? Cf. Wiggins v. Smith , 123
S.Ct. 2527, 2536 (2003); Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Subsidiary Questions :
i. In a non-capital punishment case, does an accused have a right to present
a defense and present evidence before the jury during his punishment
hearing?
ii. In a non-capital punishment case, should an accused have a right to an
effective counsel who is willing to present favorable evidence in. the face
of four witnesses willing to testify on the behalf of the accused?
iii. In a non-capital punishment case, is it reasonable why counsel would
choose not to show the jury any favorable evidence on behalf of the
accused in order for the jury to consider when assessing a defendant's
punishment?

2. Is Section 21.02(d) of the Texas Penal Code unconstitutional because it is
void for vagueness, the statute is too broad concerning specificity; and
thus, should Jacobsen and its progidy be overruled?
Subsidiary .Questions :
i. Does Section 21.02 of the Penal Code authorize or encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement?
ii. Did Texas Courts' conclusion that Section 21.02(d)'s term "[series] of
acts of sexual abuse" constitute the^underlying brute facts or means con
flict with this Court's reasoning in Richardson v. U.S. 7
iii. Should Jacobsen s decision and its prodigy be overruled because:
21.02(d)'s words create several elements, namely, the several violaeach of which the jury must unanimously and separ- tions," in respect to
ately agree upon?
iv. What is thelevel of specificity within the CSA Statute that is required
and that must be agreed upon by jurors?
v. How can a defendant defend against a CSA statute when the state is allowed
to put any and all evidence they wish to submit to the jury, tell the jury
they do not have to be unanimous in their verdict, then hold a conviction
based solely on the uncorroborated and unsupported testimony of the victim alone?

3. Should a habeas Petitioner be allowed to first have a meaningful opportunity
to be heard before a tribunal; and thus, have a fair and full hearing to
develop the habeas record pertaining to the fact-finding process, and the
resolution of controverted issuers) before the Court of Criminal Appeals
decides to deny the Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel grounds
without a written opinion? Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut , 401 U.S. 371, 379
(1971); Keeney v. Tanayo-Reyes , 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).

Whether ineffective assistance of counsel standards in capital cases apply equally to non-capital cases with severe sentencing ranges