Under 19 U.S.C. 1673, Congress directed two agencies, the Department of Commerce ("Commerce") and the International Trade Commission (the "Commission" or "ITC"), to make two distinct determinations before imposing certain duties on foreign goods. First, Commerce determines whether a class of merchandise is being sold in the United States for less than fair value (known as "dumping"). Second, the "Commission determines" whether a domestic industry has been materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, by "that merchandise." If both agencies answer yes, then antidumping duties may be imposed on "such merchandise." Commerce may later issue a "scope ruling" clarifying whether a particular product falls within the scope of an antidumping duty order. Here, in reviewing a scope ruling, the court below deferred to Commerce on whether the Commission had made a material injury determination for the merchandise at issue, rather than applying its own judgment to decide that legal question. While a petition for rehearing was pending, this Court decided Loper Light Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2261 (2024). The questions presented are:

1. Did the court below err by deferring to Commerce, rather than ascertaining for itself, whether the Commission had made the requisite material injury determination?

2. May Commerce use scope rulings to assess antidumping duties on merchandise for which the Commission did not investigate material injury?

Did the court below err by deferring to Commerce in material injury determinations and may Commerce use scope rulings to assess antidumping duties?