1. Whether the categorical restriction against executing the intellectually disabled can be circumvented via procedural hurdles implemented after litigants were initially given the opportunity to prove their intellectual disability?

2. Whether the grants of authority in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Hall v. Florida, 570 U.S. 701 (2012) which permit states to determine procedures for implementing the categorical restriction against executing the intellectually disabled also permits states autonomy to redefine intellectual disability?

3. Whether the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation that Hall constitutes new, non-retroactively applicable law or is an application of the established principle in Atkins within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989), and Chaidez v. U.S., 568 U.S. 342, 347-48 (2013), contravenes this Court's categorical prohibition against executing the intellectually disabled?

Whether the Florida Supreme Court's procedural interpretation of Hall v. Florida circumvents the categorical prohibition against executing intellectually disabled individuals