1. Does a brief written by the prosecution in a State habeas proceeding, and then rubber-stamped by State judges, qualify as a judgment entitled to deference under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254?

2. Did the Eleventh Circuit err when it denied a Certificate of Appealability on the rubber-stamping issue based on what it acknowledged was an improper standard of review?

3. Do the failures of defense counsel in a capital trial to perform any meaningful investigation, or to develop a defense case for reduced culpability or mitigation of sentence, satisfy this Court's tests for effective assistance of counsel as articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); and Andrus v. Texas, 590 U.S. 806 (2020)?

Does a brief written by the prosecution in a State habeas proceeding, and then rubber-stamped by State judges, qualify as a judgment entitled to deference under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254?