Did the Parole Board retroactively applied the wrong administrative rules and parole standards when determining not to grant petitioner a parole Interim Hearing; while the state, district courts, and U.S. Court of Appeals, failed to recognize such violations that caused petitioner's parole denial violating U.S. Constitution's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Ex Post Facto guarantees, and deciding an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. And in such case, should a lawful determination occur based on the applicable administrative rules, parole standards, and facts as they were at the time of the interim hearing denial?

Because the parole board failed to follow the process mandated by Division 50 of the parole administrative rules guiding for deferment of parole because of misconduct, should the board be prohibited to consider misconduct as the only statutory factor quoted to deny petitioner an interim hearing. In doing so violating petitioner's Due Process and Ex Post Facto guarantees, and conditions of incarceration?

Did the state appeal courts, district court, and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals incorrectly judged this case moot, when if petitioner is to prevail the board must provide a lawful basis for denying an interim hearing based on the correct administrative rules, parole standards, and facts as they were at the time of the interim hearing denial, which would cause for him to be released on parole?

Should petitioner be given credits for time served and be released on parole if he prevails in this case?

Whether the Parole Board retroactively applied rules and standards in violation of due process and ex post facto guarantees when denying petitioner's parole interim hearing