The records of the guilty plea, sentencing and probation revocation all reveal that the
judge and apparently the prosecution incorrectly believed throughout these judicial functions
that petitioner Uliman's plea of guilty to three counts of distribution of a matter portraying a
sexual performance by a minor, a violation of KRS 531.340, was a statutory "sex crime" making
him a statutory "sexual offender," which by law he was not, and under that erroneous belief
ordered Ullman to be tested for HIV, to undergo a sexual offender presentencing report, to
complete a sexual offender treatment program as a probation condition and to serve a five-year
conditional discharge sentence, all of which are by law options for statutory defined "sex
offenders," yet the Kentucky Supreme Court did not address Ullman's claim that the judge's
erroneous belief repeatedly reflected in these court records deprived Ullman of the federal
constitutional guarantee of due process in his sentencing and probation revocation.

Accordingly, the first question presented is:

WHETHER A TRIAL JUDGE, WHO OPERATES UNDER THE ERRONEOUS
BELIEF, REFLECTED IN THE RECORD, INCLUDING THE JUDGE'S
ORDERS, THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED A SEXUAL
OFFENSE AS DEFINED UNDER STATUTORY LAW, PROVIDES THE
DEFENDANT FEDERAL DUE PROCESS IN THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS AS ALL THE JUDGE'S DECISIONS WERE
CONTAMINATED BY HIS MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE STATUTORY
NATURE OF THE ACCUSED'S CRIME.

On appeal, contrary to Kentucky's appellate procedures, as reflected in rules and
decisional law, without prior notice, the Kentucky Supreme Court treated Ullman, as if he were
an appellant, when throughout this appeal Ullman has always been the appellee, and explicitly
held Ullman to preservation requirements only applicable to appellees and refused to accord him
the procedural benefits of being an appellee, depriving Ullman of review of a claim that the
Kentucky Supreme Court regarded as a palpable error potentially capable of creating a manifest
injustice in Ullman's probation revocation.

Accordingly, the second question presented is:

WHETHER A STATE APPELLATE COURT THAT, WITHOUT NOTICE,
DEVIATES FROM ITS ESTABLISHED APPELLATE PROCEDURES AND
DECISIONAL LAW TO DENY APPELLATE REVIEW OF A REASON IN
THE RECORD THAT COULD JUSTIFY AFFIRMING THE RULINGS
BELOW IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE DENIES THE APPELLEE THE
FEDERAL GUARANTEE OF APPELLATE DUE PROCESS IN VIOLATION
OF SMITH V. ROBBINS, 528 U.S. 259, 277 (2000), EVITTS V. LUCEY, 469
U.S. 387, 405 (1985), AND SWARTHOUT V. COOKE, 562 U.S. 216 (2011).

Whether a trial judge operating under an erroneous belief about the nature of a defendant's crime violates the defendant's federal due process rights