The first question presented is whether Circuits have failed to apply
categorical analysis to aiding and abetting's distinct elements, which do not meet
the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s force clause. Aiding and abetting
Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2, does not require as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use, of violent physical force under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A)'s force clause. The Circuits confuse categorical analysis—which
examines only statutory elements—with the contextually distinct rule that an aider
and abettor is punishable for the acts of a principal. Thus, Circuits are not applying
categorical analysis to aiding and abetting's distinct elements and are failing to
assume the least culpable conduct for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery. The
actus reus element of aiding and abetting merely requires the defendant to aid or
abet one element of the substantive offense, and not every element of Hobbs Act
robbery requires intentional violent force against a person or property.

The second question presented is whether the Circuits have interpreted the
actus reus of Hobbs Act robbery too narrowly and against its plain language by
requiring violent physical force as an element. The Hobbs Act robbery statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), does not require as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use, of violent physical force. By its plain language, Hobbs Act robbery
encompasses future threats to injure intangible property and does not require
violent physical force.

Whether Circuits have improperly applied categorical analysis to aiding and abetting's elements under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s force clause and misinterpreted the Hobbs Act robbery statute's requirements