Sherman Brown v. Kevin McCoy, Warden
In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), this Court recognized and endorsed a miscarriage
of justice exception to the general principle that defaulted claims cannot be reviewed in federal
habeas proceedings. This equitable exception requires demonstrating a credible claim of
innocence through "new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial."
Id. at 324. A petitioner meets the threshold showing if they demonstrate that, "in light of the new
evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find [them] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." Jd. at 327-28. Once the exception is met, the otherwise defaulted claims can
be reviewed on the merits.
Petitioner presented "new reliable evidence," including exculpatory DNA evidence and
unrefuted scientific evidence debunking the prosecution's forensic evidence at trial. The district
court denied Petitioner's Sch/up gateway innocence claim, dismissing Petitioner's new evidence
as "[a]t best . . . equivocal of guilt," and crediting less probative evidence of guilt: an unreliable
cross-racial identification and isolated post-sentencing inculpatory statements made by Petitioner
in the course of parole proceedings. As a result, the district court never reached the merits of
Petitioner's underlying constitutional claim. The Fourth Circuit declined to grant a certificate of
appealability. The questions presented are:
(1) Whether a reasonable jurist could debate the district court's dismissal of Petitioner's
"gateway innocence" claim where Petitioner presented "new reliable evidence,"
including exculpatory DNA evidence and expert scientific evidence debunking the
government's forensic testimony at trial, which together, completely undermined the
State's theory of the case and affirmatively established that Petitioner did not commit
the crime in question, and where the district court discounted Petitioner's "new
reliable evidence," and erroneously over-credited an unreliable cross-racial
identification and inculpatory post-sentencing statements made by Petitioner while
speaking to the parole board.
(2) Whether jurists of reason would find it debatable whether Petitioner's habeas petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right where the Commonwealth
presented unreliable and scientifically invalid hair and fiber evidence at trial.
Whether a reasonable jurist could debate the district court's dismissal of a 'gateway innocence' claim based on new exculpatory evidence and scientific testimony undermining the prosecution's case