I. The judge-made "concurrent sentence doctrine" allows a federal court to decline review of a prisoner's challenge to his sentence on one count of conviction if he is serving an unchallenged concurrent sentence of equal or greater length on another count of conviction. In Ray v. United States, this Court held that the doctrine does not apply on direct review of federal criminal convictions, because the mandatory special assessment imposed for each count of conviction means that the sentences "are not concurrent." 481 U.S. 736, 737 (1987) (per curiam). Notwithstanding the clarity of Ray's reasoning, several Circuits continue to authorize application of the doctrine to federal criminal convictions in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings—including convictions carrying consecutive terms of imprisonment—because those attacks have come on collateral, as opposed to direct, review. Other Circuits correctly treat the direct/collateral distinction as immaterial and reject the doctrine's application to any attack on a federal criminal conviction.

The question presented, which divides the Circuits, is: Does the concurrent sentence doctrine permit a federal court to decline review of a collateral challenge to a federal criminal conviction, even one carrying a consecutive sentence?

II. In the alternative, should this petition be held for Delligatti v. United States, No. 23-825 (U.S.) (cert. granted June 3, 2024), where one of Petitioner's 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions is predicated on the same crime of violence at issue in Delligatti?

Does the concurrent sentence doctrine permit a federal court to decline review of a collateral challenge to a federal criminal conviction, even one carrying a consecutive sentence?