The First Circuit affirmed application of a sentencing enhancement under 18
U.S.C. § 2251(e), based on Petitioner Irvin Abreu's prior state-court conviction,
holding that the modified categorical approach, rather than the traditional
categorical approach, applied in assessing whether the state-court conviction
qualified Mr. Abreau for the enhancement. To reach that conclusion, the First
Circuit found the state statute divisible, based on suggestions it found in state
caselaw, and despite the only state appellate authority to have expressly addressed
the question of divisibility having reached a contrary conclusion. In addition, when
interpreting language in § 2251(e), the First Circuit split with the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits as to whether, after this Court's decision in Lockhart v. United
States, 577 U.S. 347 (2016), courts should look to the meaning of nearly identical
language in Chapter 109A of Title 18 of the United States Code.

The questions presented are as follows:

1. Whether a federal court applying the "categorical approach" to a
prior conviction under a state statute, and deciding whether to use the
"traditional categorical approach" or the "modified categorical approach," may
reject state appellate authority addressing the issue of the statute's divisibility
in favor of the federal court's own view of state law.

2. Whether courts applying the language of the sentencingenhancement provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) should look for definitional
guidance to the nearly identical language in Chapter 109A of Title 18, as the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits have held in light of this Court's reasoning in
Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 (2016).

Whether a federal court may reject state appellate authority in determining a state statute's divisibility under the categorical approach and whether courts should look to Chapter 109A for definitional guidance in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e)