Patrick Douglas Johnson v. Texas
QUESTION No. 1: Whether the use of selective evidence is an
impermissible divide and conquer strategy for evaluating the sufidiciency of the evidence under the 14TH Amendment to the
United States Constitution when such evaluation is upon record
evidence as a whole?
QUESTION No. 2: Whether a State appellate court as a matter of
Due Process under the 14TH Amendment to the United States Constitution
isqrequired to declare witness testimony incredible as a matter
of law when the witness has testified to something or an event
that could not have occurred and which would rendered the identification
of the Defendant unreliable?
QUESTION No. 3: Whether a State appellate court as a matter of
Due Process under the 14TH Amendment to the United States Constitutionis required to preform an evaluation of the likelihood of
misidentification during its review of a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence when identification is a fact issue?
QUESTION No. 4: Whether the standard of review announced in Jackson
v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979) is an ambiguous and unconstitutional
standard of review in evaluating challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence because (1) if fails to define what sufficient
evidence is, and (2) favors the prosecution by allowing the reviewing
court to infer what the jury considered or could have considered
in reaching a verdict?
QUESTION No. 5: Is a State criminal defendant deprived of his
constitutional rights to Due Process under the 14TH Amendment
to the United States Constitution when the State appellate court
employs a standard of review regarding challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence that is contrary to the standard of review announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979)?
Whether the use of selective evidence constitutes an impermissible divide and conquer strategy for evaluating evidence sufficiency under the 14th Amendment, and whether state appellate courts are required to assess witness identification reliability and misidentification likelihood as a matter of due process