1. Does a prosecutor's violations of Federal Due Process, as were identified here by the trial court, or invalid jury instructions warrant habeas relief either independently or when combined with the failures of counsel to act upon those violations, at both trial and state collateral proceedings, to failures of counsel?

2. Do counsel's failures at the trial court and state collateral proceedings, to address violations of Due Process errors or prosecutor's violations of State laws, not only excuse the procedural default found here by the District Court, but also create an independent basis for habeas relief which was found here by the reviewing court and properly examine the Federal Sixth Amendment Ineffective Assistance of Counsel violations?

3. Is a reviewing court in a position to fully examine and properly analyze the harmful or prejudicial effects of such Due Process and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel violations without the benefit of any merits analysis of the complete Assistance of Counsel violations conducted or "passed on" by a prior court, and without transcripts of the trial, after a certification and briefing directed to the procedural default ruling, as is the case here before this Honorable Court (1993) and thereby violate the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee?

4. Does a reviewing court disregard this Honorable Court's holdings in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 when it substitutes its own review only a procedural default ruling, after having determined that some prosecutor's testimony and witness comments were impermissible and the jury's deliberative process itself for the jury?

5. In cases where violative jury instructions, prosecutorial comments, and testimony were erroneously provided to the jury without curative instruction, does Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) which prohibits inquiry into any juror's mental processes or deliberations, preclude any meaningful determination on review as to the extent of harm or prejudice caused by such violations, rendering those errors essentially "structural" for the purpose of analysis under such circumstances?

6. Is a reviewing court permitted to forego "harmless error" analysis according to this Honorable Court's directions held in Recht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) and instead choose to favor only the Sixth Amendment Assistance of Counsel analysis for Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and Fifth Amendment Due Process violations described in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)?

a) If so, does such Ineffective Assistance of Counsel analysis allow the reviewing Court to forego consideration of relevant state laws and what is the burden and what is the standard of proof in cases where Counsel violations have occurred?

Whether the prosecutor's actions and trial court's instructions violated due process and warrant independent habeas review under Griffin v. California and Miranda v. Arizona