There is substantial confusion and inconsistency among the lower courts concerning how to interpret and apply the "plausibility" pleading standard, leading courts to prematurely adjudicate claims that are not only "plausible," but that rest on a firm factual basis. This Court should clarify that the "plausibility" standard was intended to give district courts a mechanism for weeding out clearly meritless claims, but was not intended to empower district courts to adjudicate material disputed factual issues at the pleading stage without permitting at least limited and focused discovery concerning such disputed issues of fact. This case is a paradigmatic example of how the lower courts have erred in applying the "plausibility" standard, and thus, is an ideal vehicle for this Court to clarify the confusion and inconsistencies among the lower courts. The Question Presented Is:

Should this Court reconsider or clarify the pleading standards of Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) because lower courts nationwide, including the lower courts in this case, have converted this Court's "plausibility" standard for pleadings into an overly restrictive "more probable than not" standard, and in so doing (a) routinely fail to provide all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and (b) often adjudicate material disputed factual issues at the pleading stage?

Should this Court reconsider or clarify the pleading standards of Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal because lower courts nationwide have converted this Court's 'plausibility' standard for pleadings into an overly restrictive 'more probable than not' standard?