The state courts found that the trial prosecutor
knowingly presented and failed to correct perjured
testimony that the only eyewitness to identify petitioner
as one of the shooters in a capital murder had not been
promised anything for his testimony. Yet the courts
concluded that petitioner had failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the perjured testimony
was "material," as it concerned the witness's credibility
rather than his identification. On federal habeas corpus
review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that this Court has not
clearly established which party has the burden of proof
on the materiality of perjured testimony and thus held
that the state court decision was not contrary to and did
not involve an unreasonable application of this Court's
precedent. The questions presented are:

I. Whether the state courts—by requiring
petitioner to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the prosecution's knowing
presentation of and failure to correct
perjured testimony affected the verdict—
rendered a decision that was contrary to and
unreasonably applied this Court's clearly
established precedent, which requires that
the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the perjured testimony did not
affect the verdict.

II. Whether the state courts—by concluding
that the prosecution's knowing presentation
of and failure to correct perjured testimony
was not material because the jury could
have believed the witness's testimony about
the identification even if it had known that
he lied about the deal—disregarded this
Court's clearly established precedent that
impeachment evidence and exculpatory
evidence are the same for purposes of a
materiality analysis.

Whether the state courts improperly required the petitioner to prove the materiality of perjured testimony and disregarded precedent on prosecutorial misconduct