1. This case presents two substantial and unsettled questions of federal law that divide the circuits. First, whether a court may bypass a mootness inquiry into mid-litigation developments and relieve a state actor's "burden to establish that a once-live case has become moot," by substituting a standing inquiry, just because the plaintiff amends his complaint to reflect the state's mid-suit revision of a challenged rule. Contrast Zukerman v. USPS, 961 F.3d 431, 441—45 (D.C. Cir. 2020), and Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1326—29 (11th. Cir. 2001), with Greenberg, 81 F.4th at 384 n.4. And, second, whether, even under a standing framework, a First Amendment pre-enforcement challenger to a vague anti-harassment rule lacks standing to bring his challenge because a single state enforcement agent issued a mid-litigation, nonbinding, reversible, and qualified disavowal of enforcement to the challenger's planned speech. Contrast Brown v. Kemp, __F.4th__, 2023 WL 7489920 (7th Cir. Nov. 18, 2023); and Speech first, Inc v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2000), with Greenberg; see also Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (8d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.).

Whether a First Amendment pre-enforcement challenger lacks standing to challenge a vague anti-harassment rule based on a nonbinding, reversible enforcement agent's disavowal