Did the Second Circuit err in the Winter analysis of Petitioners' request for preliminary injunctive relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, including (1.) when it adopted pre-Bruen scrutiny testing for Second Amendment claims effecting the core rights of individuals and of derivative claims on behalf of individuals; and/or (2.) when it failed to evaluate Petitioners' likelihood of success in their novel theory of "to keep" from "to keep and bear arms" as having independent constitutional value to protect federally-licensed dealers in firearms as measured by the standard of "constitutional regulatory overburden?"

Did the Second Circuit err in the Winter analysis of Petitioners' request for preliminary injunctive relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, including (1.) when it adopted pre-Bruen scrutiny testing for Second Amendment claims effecting the core rights of individuals and of derivative claims on behalf of individuals; and/or (2.) when it failed to evaluate Petitioners' likelihood of success in their novel theory of 'to keep' from 'to keep and bear arms' as having independent constitutional value to protect federally-licensed dealers in firearms as measured by the standard of 'constitutional regulatory overburden?