Did the lower courts err in their preclusion of Petitioner's duress defense at trial, given the preexisting caselaw, wherein the Jury, not the Court, is to try the facts of said defense? See, United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 871 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Contento-PanchoI. 723, F.2d 691 695 (9th Cir. 1984); and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1974).

The lower courts affirmed the government's argument that a duress defense necessisated a fourth element of surrendering to authoritiesII. once reaching a position of safety, despite the 9th Circuit Court's ruling that such an element is "required only in prison escape cases...," wherein other circumstances "...the defense has been defined to include only three elements." See, United States Vi Contento-Pancho, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984). With this established precedent, were the lower courts' affirmations of these arguments , which the ruling to preclude. Petitioner's duress defense hinged upon, erroneous?

Both the pretrial and trial process contained additional cumulative errors, namely, access issues to protective order discovery, the Trial Judge's capricious ruling on the role of stand-by counsel, the improperly admitted and highly prejudical 404(b) act evidence, and the Trial Judge's frequent interruptions of Petitioner which was likewise prejudical before the Jury. These errors were deemed harmless by the 2d. Circuit Court, despite not having proven as such beyond a reasonable doubt. See, United States v. Lombardozzi , 491 F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2007); and United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 71 (2d Cir. 2021). Thus, would this neglect of precedure not contribute to the violation of Petitioner's right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and, therefore, also his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment?III.

Did the lower courts err in precluding petitioner's duress defense at trial?