1) Do additional restrictions, such as Strickland, imposed in the standard collate
ral attack waiver that are not specifically stated anywhere in Mr. Offineer's
plea agreement violate contract laws as established in decisions like Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-263 (1971) and Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738
(2019)? Does the collateral attack waiver in the plea agreement create a conflict
of interest between defense counsel and Mr. Offineer?

2) Did the appellate court rule contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)(2) and the equal
protection clause that Mr. Offineer had waived his constitutional right of access
to the courts when he signed the plea agreement despite the impediment to this
right occurring before he signed the plea agreement? Did the impediment to a law
library negate Mr. Offineer's right to knowingly and willingly enter into the plea
agreement and to provide for his own defense?

3) Was defense counsel ineffective in developing and explaining viable defensive
strategies to Mr. Offineer before advising him to plead guilty?

4) Was defense counsel ineffective by relying on Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,
2482 (2014) to argue for the suppression of evidence obtained from the warrantless
computer search? Did the appellate court incorrectly rule that because the warr
ants authorized the agents to search for evidence of OEM, they were authorized to
search Mr. Offineer's computers without a specific warrant for them?

5) Did the appellate court issue a ruling contradictory to Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) and Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 542 (2000) in stating that Mr.
Offineer's pleadings are too conclusory and impermissibly vague?

6) Is the appellate court's ruling that defense counsel was correct to deny Mr. Off
ineer an appeal because that appeal would have been "meritless" and "futile" in
contradiction to established precedents and the presumption-of-prejudice principle?

7) Was defense counsel ineffective in accepting the disparate terms of Mr. Offineer's
plea agreement as described by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2)? Was the district court's
acceptance of Mr. Offineer's plea contrary to the law as established under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)? Is Mr. Offineer's sentence contrary to the Eight Amendment's narrow proportionality principle, his right to equality, and equal pro
tection under the law?

8) Was defense counsel ineffective by failing to renove information concerning Count
I, specifically the listing of 2 victims, because that count was dropped as part
of the plea agreement? Is Mr. Offineer now unfairly burdened in trying to have
that information corrected through the B.

Plea-agreement-violation,contract-law,conflict-of-interest