WHETHER UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION CAN A DEFENDANT BE CHARGED WITH AIDING AND ABETTING UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2 WHEN THE ACTUAL PRINCIPAL WAS NOT ANOTHER ACTUAL PERSON

WHETHER AN INTERVENING SUPREME COURT DECISION HAD ABROGATED CONTRARY ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT IN UNITED STATES V. HURTADO, 508 F.3D 603, 607 (11TH CIR. 2007) AND WHETHER THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ENTERED A DECISION ON DIRECT APPEAL THAT WAS CONTRARY TO OR AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF FLORES-FIGUEROA, 556 U.S. 646, 129 S. CT. 1886, 173 L. ED. 2D 853 (2009), WHERE THE COURT HELD IN 1028A(a)(1) THE GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW THAT THE MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION AT ISSUE BELONGED TO ANOTHER PERSON

WHETHER UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION CAN A DEFENDANT BE CONVICTED AND PUNISHED FOR AN INTERSTATE COMMERCE ELEMENT FOR A DIFFERENT COUNT WHICH SHARED NO COMMON EVIDENCE AND WERE NOT BASED ON THE SAME ACT OR TRANSACTION

WHETHER PETITIONER'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WERE VIOLATED BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT AS REQUIRED BY JACKSON V. VIRGINIA, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. CT. 2781, 61 L. ED. 2D 560 (1979)

Whether a defendant can be charged with aiding and abetting when the principal was not another actual person