This Petition implicates two splits in the Circuits.

First, a district judge can grant a new criminal trial "if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 33(a). The Circuits do not agree about whether a new trial requires trial error that would have been reversible on appeal. Compare, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 251 F.3d 273, 280 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[T]he error, if any, was harmless. The motion for a new trial should not have been granted."), with United States v. Scroggins, 379 F.3d 233, 255 (5 Cir. 2004) ("A miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial in certain circumstances may occur even when there has been no specific legal error." (citations and footnote omitted)).

Second, a district court "shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Yet, "a circuit split [exists] on the issue of whether a defendant must object at sentencing to preserve error on appeal" over the insufficiency of the district court's explanation. United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5 Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

To resolve those Circuit splits, Mr. Parker asks this Court to answer the following:

1. Did the Sixth Circuit err in affirming the district court's denial of Mr. Parker's motion for new trial; and

2. Did Mr. Parker preserve for appeal a claim of insufficiency of the district court's sentencing explanation?

Whether a new criminal trial requires trial error that would have been reversible on appeal