This Court, in Burns u. Wilson, 1 stated that a federal civilian court may not consider a military habeas petitioner 's claim "when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised in that application... " The D.C. Circuit Court "has recognized that the standard of review in non-custodial collateral attacks on Court martial proceedings is 'tangled. '"2 The D.C. Circuit has therefore interpreted the Burns standard as one that "should not differ 'from that currently imposed in habeas corpus review of state conviction, ' and held that 'the test of fairness requires that military rulings on constitutional issues conform to Supreme Court standards, unless it is shown that conditions peculiar to military life require a different rule. '"3 The Tenth Circuit Court, however, has applied a much more restrictive standard. In Dodson u. Zelez, 4 the court laid out the following factors that must be overcome by a military petitioner before a Tenth Circuit court could consider a petitioner 's habeas claims:

1. The asserted error must be of substantial constitutional dimension.
2. The issue must be one of law rather than of disputed fact, already determined by the military tribunals.
3. Military considerations may warrant different treatment of constitutional claims.
4. The military courts must give adequate consideration tp. the issues involved and apply proper legal standards. 5

Since the Dodson standard was laid out by thb' Tenth'Cit'ctiit in 1990, nOit. military habeas petitioner within the Tenth Circuit 's jurisdiction has overcome those factors and had their habeas claims considered on the merits. In contrast, the banford court, cited above, had rio issue reaching the merits of that military habeas claim in the D.C. Circuit.

Are the Dddson iaptors a unconstitutional, bar -,te; habeas for military prisoners? Furthermore, does the application of the Dodson factors by the Tenth Circuit, which has failed to allow of the i fuito.d 8) merits review for any military habeas petition, amount to a violation of the equal protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Lastly, has this Court 's Burns full and fair consideration standard been eclipsed by changes to societal and military law over the past 71 years, thereby rendering the standard inadequate to its inter!ded task?

Are the Dodson factors a violation of the Suspension Clause and therefore an unconstitutional bar to habeas for military prisoners?