Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), an "owner"
or "operator" of a "facility" at the time hazardous substances were disposed must pay to remediate environmental concerns. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2). The existence and apportionment of CERCLA liability often depends on whether a party is a facility "operator." Id.

In 1998, this Court held that to be a facility "operator," an entity "must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations
having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous
waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental
regulations." United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 6667 (1998). Despite that explanation, lower courts remain
divided as to what types of activities can confer "operator" liability. The Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits consider both pollution-producing activities as well as wastedisposal and environmental-compliance activities. In
contrast, the Sixth Circuit and district courts across the
nation consider only waste-disposal and regulatory-compliance activities—but not pollution-producing activities.
The federal government has taken full advantage of this
confusion—advancing conflicting positions as expedient.

The question presented is, when analyzing whether
an entity is a facility "operator" under CERCLA, should
courts consider pollution-producing activities that the
entity managed, directed, or conducted—or should
courts instead limit this analysis to waste-disposal and
regulatory-compliance activities.

When analyzing whether an entity is a facility 'operator' under CERCLA, should courts consider pollution-producing activities that the entity managed, directed, or conducted—or should courts instead limit this analysis to waste-disposal and related activities