Robert Ybarra, Jr., is on death row in Nevada. He is intellectually disabled.
During a state court hearing on his claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002), Ybarra's experts testified that he had an IQ of 60, had deficits in adaptive
behaviors, and that the onset of his disability was during the developmental period.
The State's expert testified he received an IQ score of 66, but concluded on the basis
of the Test of Memory Malingering that Ybarra malingered the 66 score, and must
have also malingered the score of 60.

On appeal, to resolve the disputes about the testing, the Nevada Supreme
Court assumed that only testing from the developmental period was relevant. Thus,
because the court ruled the developmental period ended at age-18, the Nevada
Supreme Court believed only pre-18 evidence needed to be considered. Because all
the testing occurred after Ybarra turned 18, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected
Ybarra's Atkins claim.

On federal habeas review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nevada
Supreme Court's decision was reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) because, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned, there were alternative reasons supporting the Nevada
Supreme Court's decision. The Ninth Circuit's approach implicates two questions,
both reflecting a split between the circuit courts of appeal.

1. In Weitzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 525 (2012), this Court held that
when a state court gives alternative grounds for rejecting a federal claim, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) prohibits habeas relief "unless each ground supporting the state court
decision is examined and found to be unreasonable under AEDPA." Does the rule
announced in Wetzel apply where the rationales offered by the state court are so
dependent upon one another that they cannot be accurately described as
"alternative"?

2. In Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018), this Court explained
that deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is a "straightforward inquiry" requiring a
federal court to "simply review|[] the specific reasons given by the state court and
defer[] to those reasons if they are reasonable." May a federal court instead
manufacture other reasons—not adopted by the state court in its reasoned
decision—and defer to those reasons?

Whether the rule announced in Wetzel applies where the rationales offered by the state court are so dependent upon one another that they cannot be accurately described as 'alternative'