1. Does § 1961(1)(A) of RICO incorporate—and thereby require the
Government to plead and prove beyond a reasonable doubt—the elements of
specific state-law offenses charged as "racketeering activity," as the Second
Circuit holds, or does this provision reference only generic categories of
offenses, as the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits hold?

2. Is RICO's "racketeering activity" element "divisible," such that
courts may use the "modified categorical approach" and consider the
individual racketeering acts proven in a particular case to determine if the
defendant's RICO violation qualifies as an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) "crime of
violence," as the Second and Third Circuits hold, or are these various acts
merely different "means" of committing the single, indivisible element of
"racketeering activity," as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits hold?

Whether RICO incorporates state-law elements or only generic offense categories