I. Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant in a criminal case has the right to confront adverse witnesses against her. Where a defendant's liberty interest is at stake, due process and constitutional rights remain in effect. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 489 (1972) (citations omitted). The government continues to have the burden to prove elements of a sentencing enhancement and a defendant has the right to cross-examine government witnesses.

The question presented is:

In a contested sentencing hearing, was it proper for the court to impose a 2-point sentencing enhancement where the government used hearsay evidence provided by the case agent rather than calling the appropriate witness, alleviating the government of its burden to prove the elements of the sentencing enhancement and in violation of the defendant's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses against her?

II. In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove that the possession was in or affected interstate commerce. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), indicated that a minimal nexus to interstate commerce was sufficient to support federal jurisdiction. However, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), a subsequent ruling of the Court, noted that a substantial nexus to interstate commerce was necessary for federal jurisdiction to attach. With regard to a federal criminal statute prohibiting gun possession, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, specifically iterated that "the power to regulate 'commerce' can by no means encompass authority over mere gun possession." Id. at 585.

The question presented is:

Can the government exercise a police power over the mere possession of a firearm by establishing the interstate commerce element in a § 922(g) prosecution under the minimal nexus standard through evidence that the firearm traveled across state lines at some point prior to the actual possession of the firearm, or has Lopez effectively overruled Scarborough requiring a substantial nexus standard, i.e., that the possession involve a commercial transaction and have a substantial connection to interstate commerce?

Question not identified