Matthew Johnson v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
1. Does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which provides in part that a "1-year period of
limitations shall apply" to applications filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
require that a federal district court allow the applicant the full period
provided for by statute, notwithstanding the court's inherent power to control
its docket?
2. Does the Equal Protection Clause require a district court to treat indigent
prisoners who seek habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 similarly to
non-indigent prisoners by allowing both classes of applicants the one-year
period provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)?
3. Does the special issue asked of the sentencing jury in a capital case in Texas
violate a defendant's right to due process and to a fair trial because the jury
is punishing the defendant for future conduct, rather than past conduct, and
because the predictions about future conduct are inherently unreliable and
wrong far more often than they are right?
4. Does the Texas death penalty punishment scheme run afoul of In re Winship
and its progeny by placing the burden of proof on a capital murder defendant
to persuade the jury that he should not be sentenced to death because
mitigating factors outweigh the single aggravating factor (i.e., future
dangerousness) established by the state?
Does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) require a federal district court to allow the full 1-year period for habeas applications?