1. Did the Third Circuit in denying Petitioner a COA (Appendix A) substantially deviate from this Court's established procedures in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-337, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931, 950 (2003), by first adjudicating the merits of Petitioner's underlying claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and then, based on that merits determination, denying Petitioner's request for a COA?

2. Did the Third Circuit not only apply statutorily prohibited procedures in adjudicating Petitioner's motion for a COA (set forth above in Question #1), erroneously and prematurely concluding that Petitioner's claims lacked arguable merit as the basis for denying issuance of a COA, but also err in concluding, therefore, that this Court's ruling in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. i, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012) did not apply to excuse the procedural default regarding Petitioner's two claims (Appendix A)?

3. Did the Third Circuit impermissibly deviate from this Court's extablished procedures for deciding a motion for issuance of a COA and abuse its discretion by claiming that "jurists of reason would agree without debate, that [Petitioner's] claims lack merit or are inexcusably procedurally defaulted" (Appendix A.) when, in fact, the federal district court judge who denied Petitioner's habeas petition issued an opinion stating that Petitioner's claims appeared to possess arguable merit (Appendix C) and state and federal courts have previously granted relief in similar cases, showing that jurists of reason could indeed differ?

Whether the Third Circuit erred in denying Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability