Were John Gilcrease's due process rights violated when, after his plea and original sentence
for obstruction of justice that exceeded the maximum statutory term was vacated and remanded, the
court imposed a more onerous, consecutive sentence? Does the harsher sentence violate his right to
appeal and conflict with the decision of the Supr eme Court of the United States, North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969) concerning the presumption of
judicial vindictiveness?

Particularly where the State had not objected to or appeal ed the concurrent sentences
originally imposed, did increasing the sentence on remand by ordering that it be served consecutively
violate due process?

Where on remand, after originally imposing a sentence beyond statutory limits, the district
court failed to articulate any objective information concerning conduct on the part of defendant
occurring subsequent to the original sentencing, did the Court violate John Gilcrease's due process
rights by adding the condition of consecutive sentences to the sentence?

Did the Louisiana Seco nd Circuit Court of Appeal err in affirming an increased sentence on
remand in a case where the defendant entered a plea and there was no new information on remand?

Did the Louisiana Supr eme Court err in denying discretionary review?

Were John Gilcrease's due process rights violated when the court imposed a more onerous, consecutive sentence after his original sentence was vacated and remanded?