(1) Should this Court grant Certiorari when Halfhill was convicted of killing a man with intent upon nothing more than being of many people in the victim's orbit, when police had a primary suspect who'd made inculpatory statements but died before being charged, and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against conviction but upon evidence beyond a reasonable doubt?

(2) Should this Court grant Certiorari when trial counsel failed to raise the other primary suspect, the one police collected DNA from but never sent it to the crime lab because the suspect died, and thereafter the DNA the victim scraped off the perpetrator remained unmatched to the primary suspect who made inculpatory statements to police, in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel?

Should this Court grant Certiorari when Halfhill was convicted of killing a man with intent upon nothing more than being one of many people in the victim's orbit, when police had a primary suspect who'd made inculpatory statements but died before being charged, and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against conviction but upon evidence beyond a reasonable doubt?