I.
Carl Lindsey was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death based on
the critical testimony of Kathy Kerr, the lone witness to testify that she saw the
victim's wife give Lindsey a gun and saw Lindsey standing near the victim's body.
The prosecution, however, withheld evidence that it had granted Kerr testimonial
immunity. The Sixth Circuit denied Lindsey a certificate of appealability (COA) on
his claim that the withholding of Kerr's immunity deal violated Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Sixth Circuit's denial of a COA raises the following questions:

a. May a reviewing court find immaterial under Brady withheld evidence
that impeaches the prosecution's key witness by stating that there was
"overwhelming evidence" of the petitioner's guilt, without engaging ina
thorough analysis of the impact of the withheld evidence on the witness'
credibility and the jury's guilt and sentencing verdicts? Compare Pet. for
Cert. in Glossip v. Oklahoma, U.S. No. 22-6500 (querying whether
withheld evidence impeaching key witness was material under Brady);
Pet. for Cert. in Glossip v. Oklahoma, U.S. No. 22-7466 (querying
whether reviewing court properly applied Brady to withheld evidence
that impeaches key witness); Pet. for Cert. in Johnson v. Alabama, U.S.
No. 22-7337 (same).

b. In denying a COA, did the Sixth Circuit apply an unduly burdensome
standard for granting a certificate, and is Lindsey entitled to a COA on
his Brady claim?

II.
After securing significant evidence of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) that
trial counsel failed to investigate or present at sentencing, Carl Lindsey filed a motion
to amend his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because he filed the motion after
timely filing a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Banister
v. Davis, 590 U.S. __ (2022) holds that, at the time, there was "no longer a final
judgment to appeal from." Jd. at ___ (slip op. at 3). Banister leaves open a question
that is the subject of a circuit split:

When a party seeks leave to amend a petition after timely filing a motion
to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the party
entitled to amend upon satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 15's pre-judgment
standards, or must the party also satisfy Rule 59's standards for
amending a judgment?

Whether the Sixth Circuit applied the proper materiality standard under Brady v. Maryland