Thomas Neilsen v. John Kellner, in His Official Capacity as District Attorney, et al.
In this case, Prosecutors for the 18th Judicial District in Colorado, acting as advocates for the State of Colorado convicted an innocent man by withholding both exculpatory and properly requested discovery pre-plea. The prosecutors decided to lie about withholding discovery in pre- and post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner/Neilsen filed a 42 USC 1983 action in state court requesting the state District Court issue a declaration that prosecutors were required to follow "black letter law", established in 1935, 1963 and 1976, by this United States Supreme Court in "Mooney " "Brady " and "Agurs ".
Petitioner specifically requested that the District Court issue a declaration that prosecutors in the 18th Judicial District of Colorado are required to follow "black letter law" established 87 years ago in "Mooney v. Holohan ". The "Mooney " decision has been reaffirmed multiple times since its origin and, in every case, has required the prosecutor to correct perjured testimony. See also "Agurs ". There has never been a case that allowed a prosecutor to he to the court or withhold exculpatory and requested discovery without consequence.
In the present case, District Court Judge Gary Kramer granted the prosecution 's motion to dismiss by stating that Colorado rule Crim. 35 (c) is the exclusive remedy to address the issues presented, Kramer further stated that he was not allowed to review another state court 's ruling on discovery issues and that "Heck v. Humphrey " made this claim not cognizable under section 1983.
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Kramer 's ruling stating in addition Petitioner was not entitled to "habeas " relief because he did not file for timely "habeas " relief while he was incarcerated.
This analysis flouts this Court 's controlling precedent that has consistently required that a prosecutor must not present perjured testimony and must correct it when it occurs and that a prosecutor must provide both exculpatory and requested discovery to a defendant. This analysis also flouts this Court 's controlling precedent that "the state has the responsibility to set the record straight ". See "Banks v. Dretke ".
Prosecutors for the 18th Judicial District in Colorado and the Courts in the State of Colorado have instead chosen to give the proverbial finger to rulings of the United States Supreme Court Justices by openly defying Supreme Court precedent by incorrectly applying "Heck "and procedural issues to Petitioner 's cases. Prosecutors, attorneys for the prosecutors, and the Courts in Colorado have decided that "Mooney ", 'Brady ", "Agurs " 'Banks " and a host of other precedent does not apply in Colorado.
Prosecutors in Colorado can simply do as they please with no repercussions. They believe common law established by the United States Supreme Court Justices does not apply to Prosecutors in Colorado. State Courts in Colorado continue to sanction this type of behavior by applying issue preclusion and "Heck " to their rulings. This Court has never said that "Heck " or any of the procedural issues considered by the Courts in Colorado give the prosecution a justification to not comply with established "black letter law".
The question presented is simple:
(1) Does "Heck "or any other procedural issue bar a section 1983 petition asking for declaratory and injunctive relief when a prosecutor defiantly fails to follow "black letter law" established by this Supreme Court of the United States and the section 1983 relief requested was purposely designe
Does 'Heck' or any other procedural issue bar a section 1983 petition asking for declaratory and injunctive relief when a prosecutor defiantly fails to follow 'black letter law' established by the Supreme Court