Does Pennsylvania's allowance of unitary review require a grant of relief nunc pro tunc to individuals whose counsel wrongly imposed a Hobson's choice to either forfeit representation entirely or accept a false mutual exclusivity of direct appeal and post conviction relief issues?

Does Pennsylvania's bold rejection of the "good faith exception to the exclusionary rule" require a grant of relief nunc pro tunc to individuals who were convicted on evidence admissible only under a "good faith exception"?

Does Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 457, 15 S. Ct. 394, 39 L. Ed. 481 (1895) require that relief be granted nunc pro tunc to individuals who were convicted in state trials in which the trial court judge removed the presumption of innocence prior to opening arguments and/or prior to the presentation of evidence?

Does the fact that many years after a state sentence was served, police officers gave testimony in federal court proving that the Petitioner was, more probably than not, unknowingly and involuntarily intoxicated by carbon monoxide at and around the time of events for which he was found culpable entitle him to relief nunc pro tunc?

Are individuals entitled to relief nunc pro tunc from true threats convictions on the grounds that the alleged victims and the state willfully forfeit their previous claim of a "true threat" if it is later discovered that law enforcement officers and the alleged victims intentionally waited until after four day weekends, holidays and several months had passed prior to initiating criminal action?

Does the fact that the U.S. Senate's finding in the Trump II impeachment proceedings that the speech used by President Trump during January 2020 is constitutionally protected require the grant of relief nunc pro tunc to the Petitioner because the Senate's constitutional and statutory findings regarding alleged "true threats" are both precedential and binding on the judiciary?

Is the Petitioner entitled to relief nunc pro tunc on the grounds that Pennsylvania failed to show that the alleged "true threat" in the case below met the standard of "recklessness" defined by Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 600 U.S. 66, Pp. 4-14, 216 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2023)?

Does Pennsylvania's allowance of unitary review require a grant of relief nunc-pro-tunc to individuals whose counsel wrongly imposed a Hobson's-choice