1. The conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction
("CTPJ") is nebulous and has no consensus in State
and Federal courts. Does the theory satisfy the Four
teenth Amendment 's Due Process concerns for non
resident federal antitrust co-conspirators under the
Supremacy Clause, without resort to a State's long-
arm statutes for a private cause of action under 15
U.S.C. §15, when 15 U.S.C. §22 attaches one co
conspirator for venue and personal jurisdiction, in a
District where the victim also resides and experienc
es the injury?

2: In the alternative, whether the gap-filling All
Writs Act reaches co-conspirators for personal juris
diction with a private cause of action, by using the
analogous 15 U.S.C. §5, which allows courts on be
half of United States attorneys under §4 to invoke
nationwide jurisdiction over nonresidents to restrain
antitrust conspiracies for the ends of justice.

3. Also in the alternative, whether Georgia v. Penn
sylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), should
be overruled to include private attorneys general in
15 U.S.C. §§4's and 5's scope because the semicolon
in §4 insulates the clause that governs district
Courts' jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations
of sections 1 to 7 of the Sherman Act.

4. By burking the gravamen of our complaint's Judi
cial Code Canon 3D claim, did the courts below deny
our due process and equal protection rights guaran
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment, thus repudiat
ing Rooker-Feldman and res judicata principles,
while permitting an objectively self-imposed disqual
ified State court judge to play "velvet blackjack" with
impunity?

5. Under incorporation of the Ninth Amendment
through the Fourteenth Amendment, can direct
crime victims assert the fundamental, deeply rooted
federal constitutional right for repose to compel a
State to enforce the minimum time that a convicted
felon must serve under the published rules govern
ing a lawfully issued incarceration sentence?

6. In the alternative, whether the Court should
overrule the Slaughter-House Cases so victims of
crime can vindicate the powerful interest in punish
ing the guilty, shared by the State and Nation alike.

7. Did USAA violate the Sherman Antitrust Act by
combining with State court judges (agency capture)
to coercively and unreasonably restrain trade, by us
ing categorically forbidden cheating tactics that
harm both competition and consumers, frustrating
clear, compulsory public policy statutes, whose very
purposes are to be extremely protective of vulnerable
victims?

8. Whether USAA's relationship with the District
Court judge reasonably questions his impartiality,
disqualified him under 28 U.S.C. §455(a), and voids
his orders.

Question not identified