1. Did the courts below properly apply the Anderson-Burdick standard as a "two-tracked approach" rather than as "a sliding-scale balancing analysis" when they found the increased thresholds do not impose a severe burden on Petitioners and then determined that the thresholds were "coherent," "rational," "reasonable," and "justified" under a "quite deferential" review? Compare Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring), with id., at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting).

2. In assessing the burden to Petitioners in light of New York's requirement to collect over 1,070 valid signatures-per-day to run a candidate and thereby earn ballot access, did the courts below err by merely analogizing to prior precedent from this Court discussing collecting a certain amount of signatures-per-day—as also done by the First, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—or must a court apply a contextual analysis as it would for other ballot access restrictions, as performed by the Sixth and Eighth Circuits?

3. Did the courts below err in finding that the thresholds did not impose a severe burden (which would warrant strict scrutiny) because two "fusion" parties survived the new thresholds—i.e., parties whose existence depends on cross-nominating major party candidates for governor and now president—even though this Court has previously held that "fusion" is of little constitutional significance? See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 362–64.

Did the courts below properly apply the Anderson-Burdick standard?