1. Respondent and Louisiana courts delayed eighteen years before sentencing petitioner on two criminal convictions. It is undisputed this delay prevented petitioner from pursuing a GED, enrolling in vocational programs, and participating in other rehabilitative programs. The first question presented, left open by this Court in Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 448 & n.12 (2016), is:

What test applies to excessive sentencing delay claims under the Due Process Clause, including whether prejudice is required and what prejudice counts?

2. On remand from this Court, Louisiana courts recognized that petitioner's conviction for aggravated burglary was imposed by a non-unanimous jury, but rejected relief under Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020). That holding was based on the conclusion that a defendant's conviction as to one count becomes "final as of defendant's first appeal" even if that first appeal resulted in a remand on other counts. This outlier position requires defendants to petition this Court as to individual counts rather than wait for resolution of all counts, in contravention of this Court's general policy against piecemeal review. The second question is:

Whether, in a prosecution under a multi-count indictment on a common set of facts, the judgment becomes final for purposes of Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), when all counts are resolved, or whether defendants on direct appeal are required to seek certiorari from each count when other counts remain unresolved?

What test applies to excessive sentencing delay claims under the Due Process Clause, including whether prejudice is required and what prejudice counts?