Whether a defendant whose case was pending on direct appeal at the time of enactment of the First Step Act is entitled to the benefit of §401 (limiting the use of certain old drug convictions as ACCA predicates) where the purpose of the Act is remedial in nature and the language of §401 relative to retroactive application is ambiguous?

The Massachusetts crime of assault (without a dangerous weapon) does not satisfy the force requirement of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) because it can be committed by a mere threatened unwanted touching. Even the crime of assault and battery (without a dangerous weapon) does not satisfy the force requirement of Johnson because it too can be committed by a mere unwanted touching. The question presented is whether the crime of straight assault becomes a violent felony that satisfies the force requitement simply because it was committed with a dangerous weapon?

Whether a defendant whose case was pending on direct appeal at the time of enactment of the First Step Act is entitled to the benefit of §401 (limiting the use of certain old drug convictions as ACCA predicates) where the purpose of the Act is remedial in nature and the language of §401 relative to retroactive application is ambiguous?