Should a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discrim
inatory intent other than racial bias be actionable un
der 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the possibility of which was left
open in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971),
given 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) makes no reference to race?

Should the invidious discriminatory intent of the con
spirators be considered more vigorously, and the class-
based aspect of the conspirators' animus be deempha-
sized, when analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claims?

Should a specific intent requirement replace the class-
based animus requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)?

Should all federal courts be compelled to extend 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) protections to disabled individuals,
thereby, resolving the inconsistency, confusion, and in
congruity lingering in the class-based aspect of the
conspirators' animus giving full effect to the Congres
sional purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) in line with 42
U.S.C. § 12101- ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)?

Does the U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 5 authorize Con
gress to reach purely private conduct?

Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) should
the constitutional basis of Congressional power to en
act 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and to use it to reach private
conspiracies be based on the U.S. Const, amend. XIV,
§5?

Should all federal courts hobble 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
with the U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 5's state action re
quirement, given this Court refused to do so in Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) expressly addresses persons not states?

Should a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)